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How (Not) to Regulate Assisted




On January 26, 2009, Nadya Suleman gave birth to octuplets by means
of in vitro fertilization (IVF). Initially heralded as a medical miracle, this
event ultimately exposed Suleman to intense public anger and outrage as
the details of her life began to surface-that she was an unemployed
single mother who already had six children, and was supporting herself
with worker's compensation and disability benefits.' Nadya Suleman has
been widely demonized as the "Octomom"2 -a clever juxtaposition of
octuplets and mother that conjures up images of a sinister octopus-like
figure with eight squirming tentacles, reminiscent of the evil sea witch in
Disney's Little Mermaid movie.
An article in the medical journal Fertility and Sterility characterized the
birth of the Suleman octuplets as a "truly transformative event" because it
incited so much controversy and because it "served as a catalyst to exam-
ine a range of clinical and ethical decisions."3 After these births, the
American Society for Reproductive Medicine (ASRM) and the Society
* Professor of Law, University of California, Hastings College of the Law.
1. Jessica Garrison, Kimi Yoshino & Catherine Ho, Op. Ed., Octuplets' Birth Spawns
Outrage from Public, L.A. TilEs, Feb. 7, 2009; available at http://articles.latimes.com/2009/
feb/07/locallme-octuplets7; Rong-Gong Lin II & Jessica Garrison, California Medical Board
Revokes License of "Octomom" Doctor, L.A. TIlEs, June 2, 2011, available at http://articles.
latimes.com/201 1/jun/02/local/la-me-0602-octomom-doctor-20110602.
2. I deliberately use the label "Octomom" in my title to evoke these images, but I do not
approve of that epithet, so from now on I will refer to the mother of the octuplets by her actual
name, and not as Octomom.
3. Steven Ory, The American Octuplet Experience: A Transformative Event, 94 FERTILITY
& STERILITY 337 (2010).
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for Assisted Reproductive Technology (SART) were besieged by calls
from reporters and the general public raising questions about the lack of
regulation in the field of fertility treatments.4 The public outcry altered the
public attitude towards ART and prompted a legislative backlash. Several
states proposed new laws to regulate ART.5 Both Georgia6 and Missouri'
proposed, but ultimately did not enact, legislation that would have limit-
ed the number of embryos that could be implanted in a woman's womb at
the same time. The California Legislature considered a bill that would
have placed fertility clinics under the jurisdiction of the Medical Board of
California,' although this bill was ultimately vetoed by then-Governor
Schwarzenegger.
Some critics of Nadya Suleman focus upon the medical procedures
that led to the birth of octuplets, such as the implantation of an excessive
number of embryos in her womb.9 Yet other critics focus upon Nadya
Suleman herself-her identity as a non-white single mother who was
unemployed and had been supporting herself with worker's compensation
and disability payments for several years. They also question Suleman's
mental state, as well as her ability to parent eight more children, when she
already had six children under the age of eight, and was living with her
4. Id. According to Ory:
The ASRM Public Affairs office received more than 100 queries from various news organiza-
tions. Many were seeking background, but several interviewers inferred that ASRM and SART
bore direct responsibility, asking questions such as, "what are you going to do about this" and
"how did you allow this to happen?" Similar concerns and opinions were publicly and private-
ly expressed by some [ASRM and SART] members.
Id.
5. S. McAffrey, "Octomom" Spawns Bills Limiting Embryo Implants, USA TODAY, Mar.
5, 2009, available at http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/news/nation/2009-03-04-octo-billN.htm.
6. The legislation proposed in Georgia, titled "The Ethical Treatment of Human Embryos
Act," would have limited the number of embryos that could be transferred to two embryos for
women under age forty and three embryos for women age forty and older. It also would have
restricted the total number of embryos that could be created in a single cycle to the number that
could be transferred in that cycle. S.B. 169, Gen. Assem. (Ga. 2009). See http://www.legis.
ga.gov/legis/2009-10/versions/sbl69_As-introducedLC_37_0857_2.htm. These provisions
were ultimately removed from the bill due to opposition from a large group of patients and
physicians. See Ory, supra note 3, at 337.
7. The Missouri bill would have adopted current ASRM-SART Guidelines on the maxi-
mum number of embryos to be transferred for women at various ages into state law. H.B. 810,
95th Gen. Assem., 1st Reg. Sess. (Mo. 2009).
8. The bill, SB 674, would have placed fertility clinics and cosmetic surgery providers
under the jurisdiction of the Medical Board of California. See Malcolm Maclachlan,
"Octomom" Inspires Bill to Regulate Fertility Clinics, CAPITOL WEEKLY, Mar. 5, 2009,
available at http://www.geneticsandsociety.org/article.php?id=4567.
9. Nadya Suleman initially informed reporters that only six embryos had been implanted
in her womb but two had split, resulting in the birth of eight children. However, at the hearing
to determine whether or not to revoke his medical license, her physician, Dr. Michael Kamrava,
admitted that he had actually implanted twelve embryos in her womb.
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parents in a three-bedroom house on the verge of foreclosure.
Suleman's case provides a paradigm, both for how to regulate, and,
especially, for how not to regulate, ART. Suleman's case exemplifies the
line between status and conduct-based regulation of ART because it has
triggered calls for both kinds of regulation. Status-based regulation would
limit ART to certain types of people while conduct-based regulation of
ART would regulate what may be done but not who may do it. To those
concerned with equality, ART regulation should focus upon conduct
rather than status, upon what may be done and not who is doing it.
Moreover, the concern for equality leads me to prefer direct and visible
regulation to indirect, invisible regulation, which tends to be discrimina-
tory and to privilege majoritarian values. Finally, clearly articulated regu-
lations that are enacted by publicly accountable bodies are preferable to
ad hoc, discretionary determinations rendered by a patchwork of individ-
ual decisionmakers, such as physicians, fertility clinics, professional
organizations, or even judges and juries ruling in different cases.
II. Status vs. Conduct Regulation
Suleman's case exemplifies the line between status and conduct-based
regulation of ART because it has provoked calls for both kinds of regu-
lation. Status-based regulation would confine ART to certain types of
people, for example, married couples rather than single persons, or
heterosexuals rather than homosexuals. Status-based regulation might
also restrict access to ART based upon factors such as race, sex, socio-
economic class, or disability. Conduct-based regulation of ART, on the
other hand, would regulate what may be done but not who may do it. For
example, laws prohibiting certain technologies, such as reproductive
cloning, or laws limiting the total number of embryos that can be
implanted in a woman's womb at the same time, would regulate conduct
in order to prevent potential harm-either to women or to the children
born of such technologies. Yet such laws would not limit the kinds of
persons that could have access to ART.
I have previously discussed this distinction between status and con-
duct-based regulation of ART.1 0 My approach to constitutional analysis of
ART emphasizes reproductive equality rather than reproductive liberty. I
argue that there is no general right to use ART as a matter of reproductive
autonomy, but here may be a more limited right to use ART as a matter
of reproductive equality. Accordingly, the government could prohibit use
of a particular technology across the board for everyone. However, once
10. Radhika Rao, Equal Liberty: Assisted Reproductive Technology and Reproductive
Equality, 76 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 1457 (2008).
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the state permits use in some contexts, it should not be able to forbid use
of the same technology in other contexts. Hence, all persons must possess
an equal right, even if no one retains an absolute right, to use ART.
My theory does not bar the government from drawing any lines with
respect to ART; instead, it simply circumscribes the state's regulatory
power when the lines between what is permitted and what is proscribed
are unconstitutional. Lines drawn based upon the status of the persons
involved should be judged unconstitutional, whereas lines drawn to
differentiate between different acts should be deemed constitutional.
Hence, a law that permits ART to be used by married persons, but not
single persons, or by heterosexuals, but not homosexuals, should be
deemed unconstitutional. However, a law that merely distinguishes
between different acts, such as a law that limits the total number of
embryos that may be implanted in a woman's womb at any one time, will
likely be judged constitutional.
Applying this theory to the Suleman case, laws that would limit access
to ART based upon the status of the persons involved should be deemed
impermissible, but laws that evenhandedly regulate conduct in order to
prevent harm should be judged constitutional. This raises the question
why so many people feel indignant about the birth of octuplets to Nadya
Suleman? Almost everyone appears to disapprove of Nadya Suleman, but
the reasons behind their disapproval are remarkably varied. Many critics
decry the fact that Suleman sought to have children by means of IVF, even
though she was an unemployed, non-white single mother who was receiv-
ing government assistance in the form of disability payments. From the
perspective of equal liberty, these are impermissible factors upon which
to premise regulation because they would limit access to ART based solely
upon the individual's position in society.
Setting aside purely status-based factors, such as Suleman's marital
state, her ethnicity, or her income level, some of Suleman's critics empha-
size the sheer size of her brood. They find it outrageous that Suleman gave
birth to octuplets when she already had six children under the age of eight.
These critics argue that "eight is enough," and that Suleman's inordinate
desire to reproduce in such large quantities is the cause for concern.- But
what exactly is so objectionable about having eight-or even fourteen-
children? U.S. law generally does not limit family size for fertile persons,
so can or should we cap family size for the infertile? And if the problem
is not the size of Suleman's brood, but rather the fact that she had so many
children as an unemployed, non-white single mother who was receiving
disability payments, then once again, her offense seems to turn upon who
she is rather than what she did. But perhaps the problem is not that
Suleman now possesses a total of fourteen children, but rather that she
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gave birth to eight children at the same time. In this case, the problem is
not that "eight is enough," but rather that eight at one time is too much.
This is because multiple births-especially in such high numbers-pose a
grave risk of harm, both to the mother and to the children born as a result
of ART. I believe that laws that focus upon this type of behavior and reg-
ulate it evenhandedly and across the board for everyone should be deemed
constitutional.
Still other critics focus upon Suleman's actions and what they seem to
suggest about her mental capacity. These critics argue that Suleman's
extraordinary desire to have so many children under such extreme circum-
stances itself provides evidence that she is unhinged or mentally unstable
and, thus, unfit to be a parent. But once again, U.S. law does not generally
condition a fertile person's right to have a child upon proof of a certain
psychological or mental capacity, so can or should we demand a psycho-
logical exam as a prerequisite for infertile persons to have children?
Although these criticisms appear to be couched in the language of conduct,
I fear that they inevitably turn upon status and may lead to dangerous judg-
ments regarding who is "fit" to be a parent and who is not. For example,
would we infer mental instability if the same desire to have a large number
of children were manifest in a heterosexual married couple," or a fabu-
lously wealthy and famous movie star, such as Angelina Jolie? In light of
the tragic history of forced sterilization in the United States,12 I believe that
the power to choose who should reproduce and who should not is too great
and the risk to equality is too grave to entrust such dangerous judgments to
third parties, whether the government or the medical profession. In this
respect, I agree with scholars who argue that infertile persons should be
granted equal liberty with fertile persons, so that there should be parallel
regulation of coital and noncoital reproduction.13
III. Direct vs. Indirect Government Regulation
What are the alternatives to direct government regulation of assisted
reproductive technology? Deregulation of ART is a myth-in our
Foucauldian world, government is omnipresent. One alternative to direct
government regulation is the indirect regulation of ART that already
11. See, e.g., CHEAPER BY THE DOZEN, (20th Century Fox 1950) (laudatory depiction of a
family with twelve children).
12. Laws authorizing forced sterilization often appear to be linked to various forms of
discrimination based upon socioeconomic class, race, or other indicia of powerlessness. See,
e.g., Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200 (1927); Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942).
13. See Naomi R. Cahn & Jennifer M. Collins, Eight Is Enough, 103 Nw. U. L. REv. 501,
512-13 (2009) (stating that "we think families created via ART are not . .. truly analogous to
families formed by adoption. Instead, the better comparison is to families created without phys-
ical intervention.").
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exists in the form of tort liability and the rules prescribed by
family law. The tort system provides one means to regulate the safety of
ART by threatening physicians and parents with liability if they engage in
negligent conduct that causes harm to offspring.14 And the family law
system employs the allocation of parental rights and the best-interests-of
the-child standard as another mechanism to police the use of ART." I
agree with those who charge that direct government regulation of ART
poses a tremendous risk to equality because the majority may not be will-
ing to extend equal rights to use ART to members of unpopular minority
groups. Italy, for example, for a long time possessed no laws regulating
ART, yet when the country ultimately chose to enact such laws, they
explicitly confined the use of ART to married or "stable" heterosexual cou-
ples who are of the childbearing age and infertile, denying any use of these
technologies to single persons and homosexuals.16 The concern is that
ART regulation in the United States would follow a parallel path by explic-
itly restricting access to married persons and heterosexuals, although such
blatantly discriminatory laws would likely ultimately be overturned as
unconstitutional in this country. An even more insidious threat o equality
lurks in the background rules of tort liability and family law.
Tort liability is a random and haphazard process that overcompensates
some, undercompensates others, and costs a huge amount o administer,
so that it is incredibly inefficient. Yet some scholars uggest that the torts
system may be more desirable than direct government regulation of ART
because it avoids-or appears to avoid-the problem of government des-
ignation of which controversial uses of ART are undesirable and cause
harm to women or to children. For example, imposing tort liability upon
parents who genetically select traits in their offspring might appear prefer-
able to explicit government regulation because it sidesteps the vexing
problem of eugenics by not requiring the government to determine which
genetic traits are undesirable. Thus, a principal virtue of tort liability is
that it appears not to be a form of government regulation at all. Yet tort
liability does not really imply a lack of government regulation; govern-
ment has not withdrawn from the field. The government is effectively reg-
ulating by permitting tort suits to go forward, as the legislature clearly
possesses the power to enact a law that would eliminate liability. Indeed,
this is exactly what happened in California in the wake of a ruling that
14. See, e.g., Kirsten Rabe Smolensky, Creating Children with Disabilities: Parental Tort
Liability for Preimplantation Genetic Interventions, 60 HASTINGs L.J. 299 (Dec. 2008).
15. See, e.g., Mary Crossley, Dimensions of Equality in Regulating Assisted Reproductive
Technologies, 9 J. GENiER RACE & JUST. 273 (2005) (referring to laws that "prevent some
individuals from claiming legal protections relating to the parentage of children born as a result
of the use of ARTs" based upon their marital status).
16. See Rao, Equal Liberty, supra note 10.
How (Not) to Regulate Assisted Reproductive Technology 141
authorized the imposition of tort liability for the negligent use of ART. In
Curlender v. Bio-Sciences Laboratory,1 7 a California appellate court
allowed a lawsuit to proceed against a medical laboratory, which had
negligently conducted blood tests that resulted in the wrongful birth of a
child afflicted with Tay-Sachs disease. In dicta, the court also suggested
that damages might even be available against parents who negligently con-
ceived or carried to term offspring with a serious genetic disease. This lan-
guage apparently prompted the California Legislature to enact a law that
expressly relieved parents of tort liability for wrongful birth of an impaired
child." Thus, the government's failure to prevent the imposition of tort lia-
bility may itself be characterized as a form of government regulation.
More fundamentally, the torts system masks the problem of direct gov-
ernment regulation of ART only at the cost of delegating the critical
power to make decisions regarding the freedom to reproduce using ART
to a patchwork of judges or juries ruling in individual cases. By permit-
ting tort liability, government is not withdrawing from the field. Instead,
it is giving judges or juries-uneducated members of the general popula-
tion-untrammeled authority to decide which physician and parental
decisions inflict harm and which do not. 19 This greatly increases the risk
of discrimination because such sporadic decisionmakers are likely to
enact their own conscious or unconscious biases through the subjective
and malleable standards of tort law. Moreover, the lack of transparency
would make these types of discretionary decisions incredibly difficult to
challenge, effectively insulating them from all oversight.
The Suleman case provides an excellent example of the discriminatory
character of tort law. After the birth of octuplets to Nadya Suleman, her
physician, Dr. Michael Kamrava, was accused of "gross negligence" by
the California Medical Board and ultimately lost his license to practice
medicine.20 It is not clear exactly why Kamrava was accused of gross neg-
ligence-whether it was because of what he did, or whether it was
because of the identity of his patient. The first and second causes for
discipline alleged in the Medical Board's complaint suggest that he was
17. Curlender v. Bio-Sciences Laboratories, 165 Cal. Rptr. 477 (Ct. App. 1980).
18. Id. at 486.
19. Id. at 489. The Curlender court also suggested that the parents of a seriously impaired
infant who, with full knowledge of the child's likely condition, "made a conscious choice to
proceed with a pregnancy" could be held liable "for the pain, suffering and misery which they
have wrought upon their offspring." Id. In response to this suggestion, the California Legislature
enacted section 43.6 of the Civil Code, which provides that "[n]o cause of action arises against
a parent of a child based upon the claim that the child should not have been conceived or, if
conceived, should not have been allowed to have been born alive." Turpin v. Sortini, 643 P.2d
954 (Cal. 1982).
20. Rong-Gong Lin II & Jessica Garrison, California Medical Board Revokes License of
"Octomom" Doctor, L.A. Tnm's, June 2, 2011.
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singled out because of his conduct in transferring a number of embryos
that far exceeded the guidelines set forth by the ASRM, and in repeated-
ly initiating a fresh cycle of oocyte retrieval when frozen embryos were
available. Yet these actions are far from unique: surveys suggest that
many other physicians engaged in precisely the same conduct without
facing any consequences. The third cause for discipline alleges that
Kamrava was guilty of gross negligence because of his "failure to refer
the patient for a mental health evaluation," even though "N.S. was a
single woman who had multiple children, all conceived from IVF [and]
[s]hortly after giving birth, N.S. repeatedly returned to Respondent for
consultation on more IVF cycles for additional pregnancies, without any
period of delay." These statements suggest that it was not so much
Kamrava's conduct, but rather the identity of his patient that led the
California Medical Board to take action against him and, ultimately, to
revoke his medical license. I fear that the California Medical Board sin-
gled out Nadya Suleman's physician and accused him of "gross negli-
gence" because he failed to adequately fulfill his role as a gatekeeper by
denying access to ART to those who depart from society's norms-in this
case, an unemployed single mother who already had too many children
conceived through IVF.
Similarly, indirect government regulation of ART by means of the fam-
ily law system for allocating parental rights and responsibilities is all too
likely to inscribe into law the preferences of majoritarian groups seeking
to replicate the "traditional family." For example, the Uniform Parentage
Act protects the parental rights of a married couple undergoing artificial
insemination with donor sperm, and provides that the sperm donor is not
the legal father of the child. However, the 1973 version of the UPA denied
the same protection to a single woman undergoing artificial insemination
with donor sperm, and this version of the UPA has been adopted in many
states, suggesting that the express rules of family law often privilege the
conventional, marital family.2 1
Moreover, such bias may be implicit in the judicial decisions awarding
custody to children born of ART, as well. For example, a New Jersey
court recently ruled that a gestational surrogate who gave birth to twin
girls by means of ART was their legal mother, over the objections of the
gay married couple for whom she had agreed to gestate the embryos.22
The court reached this conclusion (and permitted the gestational surrogate
to go to trial to obtain primary custody), even though one member of the
gay couple had provided the sperm and thus possessed a genetic connec-
21. UNIF. PARENTAGE AcT § 5(b) (1973).
22. See Stephanie Saul, New Jersey Judge Calls Surrogate Legal Mother of Twins, N.Y.
TIMES, Dec. 30, 2009).
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tion to the children that the gestational surrogate lacked, and even though
the surrogate had signed a contract agreeing to gestate and then relinquish
custody of the children.23 However, in another gestational surrogacy case
in California, the California Supreme Court ruled that an African-
American gestational surrogate was not the legal mother of a child when
she signed a contract with a straight, married couple to carry a half-
white/half-Asian embryo created with the wife's egg and the husband's
sperm. Perhaps these contradictory outcomes are actually the result of sig-
nificant factual or legal differences-diverse jurisdictions may adopt dif-
ferent approaches to the same questions. But perhaps they are the result of
the race and sexual orientation of the parties involved. When the precise
grounds for such differences are not clearly delineated, they may be
difficult to challenge as discriminatory in the realm of family law, effec-
tively insulating them from all oversight. For these reasons, I believe that
the indirect, apparently invisible, government regulation that is accom-
plished under the rubric of family law or tort liability may pose an even
greater threat to equality than direct and clearly visible legislative or
administrative regulation of ART.
The Suleman case also demonstrates the discriminatory potential of
family law. Four months after the birth of the Suleman octuplets, a peti-
tion seeking the appointment of a guardian for their estates was filed by a
man named Paul Petersen.24 The probate court denied Nadya Suleman's
motion to dismiss this petition and instead permitted an investigation to
proceed, stating that it "invites [SSA] to conduct an investigation and file
with the court a report and recommendation concerning the proposed
guardianship of the estates of the named minors."25 The California Court
of Appeals ultimately dismissed the petition because it was filed by a
complete stranger against the mother of the octuplets, and because it
failed to allege any facts indicating financial mismanagement or other
grounds to warrant judicial intervention into the private realm of family
life. 26 But this holding offers scant security, because it is quite clear that
another court ruling on the same issue would be free to reach a radically
different conclusion under the flexible forms of family law.
IV. Public vs. Private Self-Regulation
Another alternative to direct government regulation of ART is self-reg-
ulation by the medical profession. However, the evidence suggests that
self-regulation will not work because financial and other incentives drive
23. Id.
24. See Nadya Suleman v. Superior Court, 103 Cal. Rptr. 3d 651 (Ct. App. 2010).
25. Id. at 1294.
26. See id.
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doctors to ignore or flout professional guidelines, and the medical profes-
sion lacks the power or the will to effectively enforce these guidelines.
Before the birth of octuplets to Nadya Suleman, the ASRM had already
established guidelines regarding the maximum number of embryos to be
implanted in women at various age ranges, yet her physician flagrantly
and repeatedly violated these guidelines. Dr. Michael Kamrava claimed
that he departed from the guidelines and implanted the unprecedentedly
large number of twelve embryos because Suleman requested him to do so,
even though he understood that this would endanger both her health and
that of her potential offspring. Concerned about backlash after the birth of
the octuplets, the medical profession attempted to make an example of her
physician by belatedly enforcing its guidelines against him: Dr. Kamrava
was first expelled from the ASRM and later accused of "gross negligence"
by the California Medical Board, which forced him to undergo a lengthy
hearing and ultimately concluded that he should lose his medical license.
Suleman's physician is the first person ever to have been disciplined for
violating ASRM guidelines, even though studies demonstrate that his con-
duct of implanting many more embryos than is recommended under the
guidelines was not an isolated departure, but a relatively common occur-
rence. A 2010 article published in Fertility & Sterility examined embryo
transfer practices in the United States and found that 94% of the clinics
surveyed reported routinely following ASRM embryo transfer guide-
lines.27 However, 55% of these same clinics conceded that they would
depart from the guidelines based upon a patient's request28-precisely the
same behavior that caused Dr. Kamrava to be expelled from the ASRM
and lose his medical license. Another 55% of the clinics stated that they
would deviate from the guidelines for cycles involving the transfer of
frozen embryos, while 75% would deviate for patients with previously
failed IVF cycles.29 Thus, the data suggests that self-regulation will not
work because physicians frequently fail to follow their own professional
guidelines and because the medical profession is unable or unwilling to
effectively enforce these guidelines against the vast majority of physi-
cians and fertility clinics.
In addition, the financial incentives to flout the guidelines are com-
pelling, as clinics implant many more than the recommended number of
embryos in order to inflate their success rates and attract patients. Indeed,
27. Emily S. Jungheim et al., Embryo Transfer Practices in the United States: A Survey of
Clinics Registered with the Society for Assisted Reproductive Technology, 94 FERTILITY &
STERILITY 2 (2010), available at http://www.fertstert.org/article/S0015-0282(09)02483-2/
fulltext.
28. See id. at 2.
29. See id. at 2-3.
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these incentives may actually be exacerbated by the sole federal law
regulating the fertility industry, the Fertility Clinic Success Rate and
Certification Act of 1992, which creates a system for the accurate report-
ing of information regarding the efficacy of fertility treatments.30 By
requiring clinics to report their success rates, which are calculated based
upon the total number of live births, this law perversely encourages
clinics to employ techniques that may lead to multiple births in order to
maximize the total number of children born using ARTs. Another article
in Fertility & Sterility suggests that these incentives might be reduced by
modifying the definition of "reproductive success" and redefining
the birth of triplets or higher-order multiples as a "failure" rather than a
"success."31 Perhaps these incentives might also be altered by requiring a
higher standard of informed consent, for example, by mandating that
patients be given information about the risks of multiple gestation and
strongly urged to accept single embryo transfer.
But there is an even more fundamental problem with self-regulation by
the medical profession. Self-regulation poses an even greater threat to
equality than government regulation because physicians and clinics are
likely to regulate in all the wrong ways. Some ART providers may
conclude that the lesson to be learned from the outcry over Suleman's
case is not to allow ART to be used by the "wrong" people-single
women, gays and lesbians, poor persons, and those with disabilities.
Empirical evidence suggests that providers will deny access to ART on a
variety of problematic grounds that turn upon the status of the participants
rather than the harms posed by their actions.
In fact, a 2005 survey of the screening practices of ART providers
revealed rampant discrimination on the basis of marital status, sexual
orientation, sex, age, economic circumstances, and health or disability.32
According to the survey, 53% of ART providers stated that they would be
extremely likely or very likely to turn away a man who does not have a
wife or partner, while 20% would reject a woman who does not have a
husband or partner.33 Along the same lines, 48% would be extremely like-
ly or very likely to turn away a gay couple, while 17% would reject a
lesbian couple.34 These statistics demonstrate that ART providers, by their
30. 42 U.S.C. §§ 263a-1 to -7 (2000).
31. Lawrence Grunfeld, M. Luna, T. Mukherjee, B. Sandler, Y. Nagashima, A.B.
Copperman, Redefining in Vitro Fertilization Success: Should Triplets Be Considered Failures?
90 FERTILITY & STERILITY 1064 (Oct. 2008).
32. See Andrea D. Gurmankin et al., Screening Practices and Beliefs of Assisted
Reproductive Technology Programs, 83 FERTILITY & STERILITY 61 (2005).
33. See id. at 65.
34. See id.
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own admission, are already discriminating against unmarried persons and
homosexual couples. But even within the categories of marital status and
sexual orientation discrimination, ART providers appear to be engaging in
a form of sex discrimination by exhibiting a marked preference for the
provision of services to women over men. Although the survey provides
no explanation for this puzzling gender-based isparity, I believe that it
probably stems from traditional gender-role stereotypes, which intimately
associate women with reproduction and childbearing.
Similarly, economic and age-based discrimination were also quite
prevalent; 38% of ART providers acknowledged that they would be
extremely likely or very likely to reject a couple on welfare who wishes to
pay for ART using social security checks, while 18% conceded that hey
would turn away a couple if both members were forty-three years old.35
Health or disability discrimination also appears common, with 59% of
ART providers stating that they would be extremely likely or very likely to
reject HIV-positive women, while 55% would exclude women who have
severe diabetes (and for whom pregnancy poses a 10% risk of death), 15%
would reject couples with limited intellectual capacity, and 13% would
turn away women with severe bipolar disorder.36 Only race discrimination
appears to be off-limits, with just 5% of ART providers willing to
acknowledge that they would turn away a biracial couple.37
In some states, the discriminatory denial of access to medical services
by physicians may be challenged under state public accommodation laws.
Indeed, this is exactly what happened in the case of North Coast Women's
Care Medical Group v. San Diego County Superior Court,38 in which a
physician refused to treat a lesbian couple seeking to have a child
by means of intrauterine insemination with donor sperm. The couple
challenged the denial of services by the physician and the medical group
under the Unruh Civil Rights Act, which prohibits discrimination based
upon marital status and sexual orientation. The California Supreme Court
ultimately rejected the physician's argument that she was exempt from
complying with the Unruh Civil Rights Act based upon the rights of
religious freedom and free speech guaranteed under the federal and state
constitutions. Thus, this ruling promises recourse against the discrimina-
tory denial of access to ART in California, yet in most other states, such




38. N. Coast Women's Care Med. Grp., Inc. v. San Diego Cnty. Sup. Ct., 189 P.3d 959 (Cal.
2008).
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V. Conclusion
The birth of octuplets to Nadya Suleman was a truly transformative
event-it completely changed the regulatory climate in the field of assist-
ed reproduction. Prior to this event, no one seemed concerned about the
lack of regulation. However, after the birth of the Suleman octuplets, there
has been a legislative backlash-several states proposed new laws to
regulate ART. The media attention also placed great pressure upon the
medical community, which as responded with a regulatory backlash and
belated attempts to enforce professional regulations: Suleman's physician
was the first physician expelled from the ASRM and later faced accusa-
tions of "gross negligence" from the California Medical Board, which
conducted a hearing and ultimately revoked his medical license.
It is no longer a question of whether to regulate ART-the only ques-
tion is how to regulate ART, and who should do the regulating. If you are
concerned about equality, as I am, then ART regulation should focus upon
conduct rather than status, upon what may be done and not who is doing
it. Moreover, my concern for equality leads me to prefer direct and
visible regulation as opposed to indirect, invisible regulation, which tends
to be discriminatory and to privilege majoritarian values. Finally, clearly
articulated regulations that are enacted by publicly accountable bodies are
preferable to ad hoc, discretionary decisions rendered by a patchwork of
individual decision makers, such as physicians, fertility clinics, profes-
sional organizations, or even judges and juries ruling in discrete and
isolated cases.

